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Abstract 
Multi-year insurance has been proposed as a tool to incentivise policyholders to invest in property-
level adaptation. In a world of rising natural catastrophe risks, such autonomous adaptations could 
have significant benefits for the property-owner, the insurer and society. We review the arguments for 
and against multi-year contracts and provide new analyses on their price implications. We conclude 
that even under conditions of known and stationary risk, initial capital requirements could be around 
50% higher for a 10-year contract than an annual contract and the annual premium around 5.5% 
higher; in the real world of changing and uncertain risks, premiums would be even higher. We also 
conclude that multi-year contracts have several additional disadvantages that are likely to limit their 
demand and availability in the general retail insurance market. For adaptation, a preliminary analysis 
of existing evidence suggests that other tools, such as risk-based premiums and loans for adaptation 
tied to the property, have greater potential.  
 
I. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, global economic losses from weather-related events have increased at a 
rate of US$2.7 billion per year in real terms; that is, a tripling of annual damages over the period 
(Neumayer and Barthel, 2011). Several studies have shown that this increase has been mainly driven 
by an increasing exposure to disasters (e.g. Neumayer and Barthel, 2011 global analyses and Pielke 
and Landsea 1998 for US hurricane losses); driven by population growth, increased wealth and an 
accumulation of people and assets in regions more exposed to weather catastrophes. These trends are 
expected to continue in the future, but also be aggravated by an increase the intensity of weather 
events globally (on average) as a result of manmade climate change (IPCC 2007). Some past authors 
have described the confluence of these pressures as a “new era of catastrophes” (Kunreuther et al. 
2009a).  
 
Managing risks from natural disasters in a world of increasing population, wealth and climate 
change will require greater action to reduce vulnerability at the local level. This includes better 
managing exposure to natural hazards, through urban and land-use planning, as well as enhancing 
societal resilience and resistance and reducing individual vulnerability. In many hazard-prone regions, 
there is evidence that property owners under invest in property-level risk reduction measures (Cabinet 
Office, 2008; Kunreuther 1996; Kunreuther et al. 1978). In a world of rising levels of risk from natural 
hazards, closing this investment gap would have significant benefits not only for property owners, but 
also insurers and society as a whole. This paper discusses the use of insurance as an economic 
instrument to incentivise autonomous adaptation. Previous authors have suggested that insurance can 
be a powerful tool in this respect as the price and availability of insurance communicates a signal of 
the level of risk to the insured (e.g. Kunreuther et al. 2009; Geneva Association, 2009; Herweijer et al. 
2009; Maynard, 2008; Ward et al. 2008). In principle this should encourage the insured to take cost-
effective measures to reduce risk. 
 
A number of authors have demonstrated that the insurance industry itself can benefit from 
doing more to incentivise risk reduction. Unhindered, climate change and an increased concentration 
of insured assets in exposed regions are likely to increase the correlation and volatility of losses to 
levels that could have profound effects on the insurability of natural hazard risks and the affordability 
of insurance (e.g. CII, 2009; Herweijer et al. 2009; Lloyds of London 2006; Mills 2005). The 
consequent public and political discontent could have knock-on effects for other lines of business, as 
observed, for example, in the Florida insurance market (Grace and Klein, 2009). 
 
There are several ways in which the insurance industry can help bring about improved 
individual and societal risk management (Herweijer et al. 2009; Ward et al. 2008). This paper focuses 
on the arguments for and against one proposed insurance tool, the introduction of multi-year insurance 
contracts alongside risk-based insurance pricing (Kunreuther et al. 2009a; Jaffee et al. 2008). It has 
been suggested that multi-year contracts, otherwise known as “long-term insurance”, which provide a 
guaranteed price (or guaranteed ceiling and floor price) over a term from 3 to as much as 25-years, 
could have significant benefits for adaptation by providing greater incentives for the insured to invest 
in cost-effective property-level resistance and resilience measures. 
 
While multi-year contracts are not unheard-of in the insurance market today, particularly in 
commercial insurance lines and for high net-wealth individuals, they are rare in the majority of general 
retail insurance markets (Goss and O’Neill, 2010). Where they do exist in the commercial and high 
net-wealth markets, the policy term is typically no more than 3 years.  
 
In the following sections, we review the arguments for and against multi-year insurance 
contracts from different perspectives. Section II examines the case for multi-year insurance contracts 
given in the academic literature. Section III provides new quantitative analyses on the implications for 
the technical price of insurance. Sections IV and V consider the broader issues of practicality and 
trade-offs. The paper focuses exclusively on P&C insurance contracts and mainly general retail 
insurance provided by the private insurance sector. Applications to the commercial market and public 
insurance providers are discussed in Section VI. 
 
II. The case for multi-year contracts 
Kunreuther (1996) identifies a number of important barriers to individual action to reduce risk 
at the property-level: financial constraints (upfront costs); lack of information or poor use of 
information in decision making; a perception that the government will provide support in the event of 
a disaster; unawareness or misperception of the true risk faced; and other behavioural issues, in 
particular short-termism1.  Kunreuther et al. 2009 suggest that risk-based insurance premiums can be 
an important tool to help overcome these barriers. The premise is that if the premium reflected the 
level of risk, and the insurer accordingly offered a risk-appropriate discount to homeowners who 
invest in loss reduction, this would provide an economic incentive to a property owner to reduce risk 
to the cost-effective level2. Similarly, an individual moving into a high risk area would be more aware 
of the risk and could act accordingly. However, in the real world, the price of a contract rarely reflects 
the true level of risk, particularly in the case of homeowner (or general retail) insurance. 
 
In practice, even with risk-based premiums in place, this economic incentive is not sufficient 
to overcome all of the observed barriers to action. For example, the technical premium reduction with 
risk reduction is often quite small compared with the upfront cost of the mitigation measure 
(Kunreuther 2005) and therefore, the economic incentive is relatively weak. In addition, Goss and 
O’Neill (2010) suggest that the incentive is further weakened because risk reduction investments do 
not tend to be reflected in property values, meaning that the benefit is lost if the individual sells the 
                                                 
1
 Studies have shown that individuals tend to focus on the returns only over the next couple of years. There is also evidence 
to suggest that temporally distant pay-offs are disproportionally discounted relative to immediate ones (e.g. see Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan 2009 and references therein). 
2
 To illustrate this, consider a simplified example. Assume that a homeowner’s insurance premium is priced at $100 per 
annum, equal to the level of average annual loss. Then if the homeowner could invest in a risk reduction measure at a cost of 
$200 that would reduce the AAL to her property by 25%, the investment would pay back after 8 years. 
property. Kunreuther et al. 2009 make several recommendations that aim to help overcome these 
barriers. For example, they suggest that loans should be provided to property-owners (from public 
schemes or other initiatives) to help spread the upfront investment costs over time (overcoming the 
financial barrier); if the annual rate of repayment were smaller than the annual insurance premium 
discount gained as a result then the property-owner would see an immediate financial benefit from the 
investment and so a strong incentive to take action. Further, if loans were tied to the property, rather 
than the individual, this would overcome the disincentive created by the prospect of moving house.  
 
Kunreuther et al. 2009 argue that this strategy works only if the property-owner could be assured 
that the insurer would continue to provide the premium discount. Hence, they recommend the use of a 
multi-year insurance contract with a guaranteed price and discount.  They argue that the multi-year 
contract, with transparent pricing, could also strengthen the economic incentive by making the benefits 
of the investment in risk reduction more visible upfront3. Additional benefits of a multi-year contract 
given by Kunreuther and Michel Kerjan (2009) include: 
• A multi-year contract at a guaranteed price (or alternatively, a price with pre-defined ceiling 
and floor) provides financial certainty for the policyholder and a guarantee of insurance 
coverage over the policy term.  
• Multi-year contracts could decrease the transaction or search costs to policyholders in a case 
where annual policies are not renewed by their insurer (though search costs may increase per 
policy as multi-year contracts mean more complex decisions).  
• Multi-year contracts could reduce administrative costs for the insurer and increase certainty by 
reducing the turnover of customers. 
• Multi-year contracts could encourage a higher degree of insurance coverage across society 
with benefits to individuals and society as a whole. For example, in some markets, 
policyholders tend to cancel or not renew contracts if no losses have occurred and this can 
leave them, and society, more exposed when an event occurs. 
 
Goss and O’Neill (2010) suggest that multi-year contracts could also increase the incentive for the 
insurer itself to invest in improving the resistance and resilience of its insured properties. Today, 
insurers have little incentive to reinstate a property in a more resilient and resistant manner as this 
tends to be more expensive and is not guaranteed to benefit the insurer as the policyholder may switch 
to another insurer (Boyer and Gobert, 2008). A more long-term relationship between the insurer and 
                                                 
3
 For example, rather than a $35 premium discount each year in an annual contract, which seems small compared to an 
upfront investment of $250, the insured would see a guaranteed $350 total premium discount over a 10-year contract. 
policyholder would help to alleviate this barrier by allowing the insurer to offset the investment costs 
against future reductions in losses to the property4.  
 
III. Price Implications 
The annual premium of a multi-year contract would likely be greater than the premium of an 
equivalent annual contract. Firstly, the capital requirements and return on capital demanded by 
investors would be higher. Secondly, uncertainty and ambiguity is greater. Thirdly, we would expect 
the expenses associated with the contract to change. In this section, we present a new analysis of the 
impacts of the capital loading on the premium for a multi-year contract and draw on past studies to 
discuss expenses and the impact of uncertainty on the premium.  
 
III.1 Capital loading under conditions of known and stationary risk 
The formula to calculate the premium of an insurance contract can be expressed as Eqn. 1, 
where P is the annual premium, E(C) is the annual expected value of claims, E(X) is the annual 
expected value of expenses and α⋅K represents the capital loading, where K is the capital requirement 
and α is the annual return on capital demanded by shareholders. 
 
KXECEP ⋅++= α)()(       (1)  
 
To explore the impacts of the length of the policy term of the premium we determine P via 
stochastic simulation of claims, expenses and an investment process. The method is detailed in 
Appendix A and assumes that the risk is stationary and known. We impose the condition that the 
insurer must remain solvent (i.e. premiums plus capital must exceed claims plus expenses) at all times 
with 99.5% probability (i.e. a 1-in-200 year continuous solvency condition).  
 
Figure 1 shows the resulting annual premium for a multi-year contract as a function of the 
length of the policy term, from one to ten years. The annual premium is shown for two cases: for a 
constant value of α (set at 10%) and for a value of α that increases with the policy duration (from 10% 
for a one year contract to 12% for a ten year contract). We suggest that the second case is more 
realistic as shareholders will demand a higher return on capital for a longer guarantee period. In both 
                                                 
4
 The viability of this decision would depend on the case. It is likely that the contract would need to be much longer than 5 
years to offset the investment costs. Goss and O’Neill (2010) suggest that the premium would need to be much higher than 
for a contract without resilient reinstatement (e.g. perhaps 40% higher for a 5-year flood insurance contract on a high risk 
property and greater for a lower risk property). 
cases, the annual premium is shown to increase with the duration of the policy. Figure 1 shows the 
reason for this increase is that the capital requirement increases with a longer policy term; K is more 
than 50% higher for a 10-year contract than an annual contract. The annual premium is around 5.5% 
higher for a 10 year contract for increasingα.  
 
 
Figure 1: Annual premium (left) and capital requirement (right) as a function of the length of the policy 
term for a multi-year insurance contract. 
 
If the solvency condition is relaxed such that solvency is assessed only at the end of the term, 
allowing insolvency in between, then this reduces the impact of policy duration on the premium 
(Figure 2). This case is equivalent to being able to raise additional capital at a floating rate equivalent 
to the yield on the asset mix of the company. This would not be realistic for a company in distress. 
With the more relaxed solvency condition, the annual premium plateaus at a duration of around 5 
years and falls gradually beyond around 8 years. At the plateau, capital requirements remain around 
30% higher than for an annual contract. 
 
  
Figure 2: Annual premium (left) and capital requirement (right) as a function of the policy duration under 
conditions of continuous solvency (solid) and solvency at the end of the policy term (dashed) for constant α 
 
Capital requirements are higher for a multi-year contract because the insurer must hold 
additional capital to cover the possibility that multiple claims are paid over the policy duration. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3, which shows a simplified simulation representing the ratio of the sum of the 
total premium income and investment return (ignoring profits) to the total claims and expenses paid, 
against time (in years)5.  If no capital were held, a value less than 1 on the y-axis would imply that the 
insurer has become insolvent; that is, the sum of claims and expenses has exceeded accumulated 
premium income. The simulation is stochastic6;  individual simulation runs are shown in grey and the 
5th and 95th percentiles are bounded by red solid lines indicating a ‘solvency envelope’ where the 
solvency criteria is hypothetically set at a 95% Value at Risk.  The further the envelope is below 1 the 
more capital a company would need to remain solvent with 95% confidence up to that term.   The 
simulation demonstrates that the capital initially increases as the policy term increases and reaches a 
peak at around 2 to 3 years. The required capital then declines and becomes negligible after about 10 
years, in this simple example.  
 
This simple example can explain our findings in the more complex premium model under the 
condition of solvency at the end of the term (i.e. where claims can be paid from the total accumulated 
premium plus initial capital at the end of the term). It demonstrates that for shorter length contracts, 
around 2 to 5 years, there is a higher chance that total accumulated premium over the policy duration 
                                                 
5
 this is effectively the inverse of the combined ratio with investment return 
6
 The process shown in Figure 3 is a simple geometric Brownian motion process defined by tW
t eX
σµ +
= where µ = 0.04, 
σ=0.05 and Wt is a Weiner process with zero mean and unit variance.  
is not adequate to pay claims and maintain solvency, and therefore, more capital must be held initially 
to ensure that the solvency condition is met. From Figure 3, the most rapid increases in capital 
requirements occur between year 1 and year 3. For a policy term of beyond around 8 to 10 years, the 
total premium accumulated over the policy duration is more than adequate to pay claims and maintain 
solvency with the required probability (95%), so the initial capitalisation can be reduced.  We stress 
this simple example only tests solvency at the end of the policy term, where mid-term losses can be 
recouped from future premiums. Under the more conservative (and realistic) condition of continuous 
solvency (Figure 1) we do not observe a plateau and decline in capitalisation requirements because 
any claims must be covered by the premium accumulated up to the point of the claim plus initial 
capital, rather than the premium accumulated over the entire policy duration, so the initial 
capitalisation must be higher.  
 
 
Figure 3: Stochastic simulation to illustrate the solvency process. The simulation represents the ratio of claims to 
the accumulated premium plus capital (y-axis) versus time in years (x-axis). The grey lines are individual 
simulations, the red dashed line shows the expected values and the solid red lines bound the 5th and 95th 
percentiles. Simulations with a y-value less than 1 can be interpreted as insolvent. 
 
 
The simulations presented in this Section are for only one policy. In reality, a (re)insurer will 
be able to diversify risks across a broad portfolio of policies, lines of business and regions. However, 
we do not believe that this would change the fundamental conclusion of our simulation that the annual 
cost of a multi-year contract would be higher than an equivalent annual contract. Kreps (1990) 
suggests that the (re)insurer should require a rate of return on the marginal amount of capital required 
by the new policy. Where the new policy is correlated with the existing portfolio, our model is 
adequate. If the new policy were a new class of business or in a region that is not correlated with the 
existing portfolio then the additional capital required may be smaller, but still greater than that for an 
equivalent annual contract. 
 
III.2 Expenses associated with a multi-year contract 
It is not clear how the longer policy term of a multi-year contract would affect the expenses of 
the contract; that is E(X) in Eqn. 1. The turnover of clients should be lower and therefore, marketing 
costs should be reduced. The administrative costs could be smaller as the contract is renewed less 
often; however, interviews with insurers reported in Goss and O’Neill (2010) suggest that this 
decrease will be marginal as insurers would still need to communicate annually with policyholders and 
regularly review risk levels. In addition, Goss and O’Neill suggest that providing multi-year insurance 
could entail a number of additional start-up costs that would need to be recouped through premiums 
and they argue that the sale of multi-year contracts would require greater interaction with the 
salesperson to appropriately assess risk, explain conditions and reduce the scope for mis-buying, 
increasing the administrative costs per policy.  
 
III.3 The impact of uncertainty on premiums 
The largest contribution to the increase in premiums for a multi-year contract is likely to come 
from the increased uncertainty in each of the elements of Eqn. 1 with the length of policy term. 
Kunreuther et al. 1995 demonstrates that the premium of any insurance contract will be higher under 
conditions of uncertain or ambiguous risks and Jaffee et al. (2008) demonstrate that an insurer’s 
aversion to ambiguity increases significantly with the policy term. While the pricing of annual 
contracts will also be subject to uncertainty, it will be greater for a multi-year contract as risk and 
policy conditions may change over time in ways that are difficult to predict. Where the premium of a 
multi-year contract is guaranteed, an insurer would need to anticipate changing levels of risk and 
conditions and price these into the contract from the start.  
 
There are several drivers of changes in risk over time. Aerts and Botzen (2011) explored two 
potential drivers, the impact of climate change and socioeconomic development. Their analysis 
focussed on the component E(C) of the premium for a multi-year contract, for the case of flood 
insurance in the Netherlands. They demonstrate that changes in risk could lead to significant, but 
uncertain, underestimate of E(C) of up to around 80% for a 5-year contract and 140% for a 15-year 
contract when compared with the stationary risk assumption. As uncertainty increases over time, the 
premium would be higher for a longer policy term. In addition, for a longer contract, there will be 
greater uncertainty over vulnerability (including policyholder or local government actions to reduce 
vulnerability), repair costs, regulatory and legal7 regimes (which lead to higher than expected expenses 
or claims), taxation changes, and the price and availability of capital and reinsurance. These trends are 
difficult to anticipate and adequately price. Capital will need to be held against all these contingencies 
and the higher ambiguity over such long-term changes in risk and the conditions for insurance will 
mean that shareholders demand a high return on capital to compensate for the considerable risk. Each 
of these factors will increase the capital loading of the premium, making it greater than is suggested by 
our analysis with known and stationary risk. 
 
IV. Disadvantages of multi-year contracts 
 
IV.1 Higher premiums and lower flexibility for policyholders 
The higher price of a multi-year contract (Section IV) means that for the policyholder there is 
an advantage of a shorter policy term. Indeed, in the survey carried out by the Association of British 
Insurers (ABI) in 2009, of the forty-three percent of respondents that were interested in multi-year 
contracts, 97% felt that the price of a multi-year contract should be less than or equal to that of an 
annual contract (Goss and O’Neill, 2010). The ABI survey found that many respondents were 
concerned about the possible disadvantages of multi-year contracts. The advantage of an annual 
contract for the policyholder is that it provides flexibility and choice; the option to renew or 
renegotiate a contract, or switch to an alternative insurer, to ensure that they get the best price and 
conditions for insurance. This must be weighed against the disadvantage that prices may fluctuate over 
time, as well as the potential higher search costs if a policy is cancelled by the insurer.  
 
IV.2 Lower flexibility for the insurer and less efficient use of capital 
For the insurer, a multi-year contract has the advantage of limiting turnover in policyholders, 
but also limits the ability of the insurer to renegotiate the contract or cancel in response to changing 
conditions or new information; this could mean greater liability, but also an increase moral hazard. In 
addition, the flexibility to raise premiums if necessary after a disaster is an important ‘pressure valve’ 
for the insurance markets. For the insurer it is an important way to rebuild their balance sheet8. 
Without this pressure value, more capital would need to be held in the first instance and premiums 
would need to be set higher. This not only implies a higher premium but also a less efficient use of 
                                                 
7
 For example, court judgements sometimes re-interpret the risk landscape deciding that claims which were not 
thought to be covered by the insurance industry should be paid. 
8
 The reason for the premium increase after a disaster is that in these circumstances the availability of capital is often 
restricted and higher rates of return on capital are demanded from investors, increasing the cost of providing insurance 
coverage. The converse of this is that premium rates typically fall after a number of benign years. 
capital and associated opportunity costs to the insurer9. In reality, the inability to rebuild the balance 
sheet in the event of a significant loss is likely to be seen by private insurers as a severe impediment to 
offering multi-year contracts. Goss and O’Neill also report concerns of the European Commission that 
multi-year contracts have historically hindered competition and created a barrier to new entrants in the 
market, increasing premium costs. 
 
IV.3 Long-term guarantees and the risk of insolvency 
In Section III.3 we assume that the insurer is able to adequately foresee changing risks and 
conditions and price this into the premium at the start of the contract. However, as history has shown, 
our ability to predict the future is limited. For the insurer, the likelihood and impact associated with 
mispricing a policy are larger than for an annual contract, where premiums can be adjusted each year 
in response to new information. In extreme cases, large-scale mispricing could lead to insolvency and 
on a smaller-scale a less efficient use of capital. 
 
An example of this has already been played out in the UK life assurance industry. In the UK, 
life assurance companies write long-term business. We consider three of their products that offer 
considerable guarantees over the long-term: life annuities, pensions savings with guaranteed annuity 
rates, and with-profits policies (Table 1). In the 1970s, 80s and early 1990s when many of these 
policies were written, interest rates were often in the double figures, mortality rates were considerably 
higher and regulation was less onerous so expenses were lower. At the time insurers believed they 
were making good decisions, anticipating the risks, and pricing policies accordingly. However, this 
assumption proved to be false; interest rates have fallen considerably10 (from long-term rates of around 
15% p.a. at the start of the 1990s to 0.5% p.a. in early 2011), mortality rates have gradually improved 
due to new medicines, changes in diet and a reduction in smoking (the UK Office of National 
Statistics estimates that over the past 30 years, age-standardised mortality rates have declined by 49 
and 41 per cent for men and women, respectively), and regulation has tightened leading to greater 
expenses.  When the guaranteed annuity rates started to bite it cost the UK life assurance industry tens 
of billions of pounds to set up the required realistic reserves and this was one of the drivers of the 
financial difficulties suffered by the firm, Equitable Life, the UK’s oldest life assurance company.   
 
 
                                                 
9
 In the case of an under-pricing of contracts, the insurer would be forced to seek additional capital to cover liabilities at 
higher cost; whereas for over-pricing of contracts, the insurer would see an opportunity cost from holding too higher reserves. 
10
 Although some of the interest rate risk was reduced significantly with close matching of asset cash flows with those of 
liabilities there remained a material level of risk 
Product Description Effective Guarantees 
Life annuities Provide regular payments until the 
death of the insured.   
Interest rates until death 
Average policyholder mortality 
Pensions savings with 
guaranteed annuity rates 
Provide a specific conversion rate 
from accumulated savings into annuity 
rates. 
Spot interest rates years ahead 
Future expenses levels 
Mortality rates at retirement 
With-profits policies Companies offering these products 
take regular savings (or lump sums) 
and invest them. The policyholder 
receives a guarantee no drop in value 
and guaranteed regular bonuses. 
Investment market fluctuations 
Table 1: Long-term guarantees implied by three life assurance products 
 
As in the life assurance case, a multi-year property insurance is effectively providing a 
guarantee against interest rate changes, capital market fluctuations, changes in expenses (e.g. due to 
regulation) and other regulatory changes. A multi-year policy with guaranteed premium has no 
opportunity to adapt to the changing nature of risk. Difficulties in anticipating the future, means it will 
be probable that polices are under or over-priced as a consequence. Arguably, anticipation of changing 
risk is even more complex for property insurance than it was for the UK life assurance market with the 
additional challenges of climate change, natural climate shifts, trends in exposure and shifting 
vulnerabilities to natural hazards. A more likely outcome is that in a competitive market and under 
uncertainty, insurers would tend to restrict policies to shorter durations11. 
 
Given these risks associated with fixed premiums, a multi-year contract with variable 
premium might be a more desirable prospect for the insurance industry (Goss and O’Neill, 2010; Aerts 
and Botzen, 2011). This would also help to reduce the price differential between annual and multi-year 
contracts and so make them more competitive on the market. Kunreuther et al. (2009) propose that 
prices be renegotiated over time based on new information, for example based on a regularly 
monitored risk index arbitrated by a third party. However, such a system would bring considerable 
technical challenges12. We argue that allowing premia to adjust each year, even within a defined range, 
                                                 
11
 Jaffee et al. 2008 suggest that this problem for insurers may be lessened if reinsurers were to provide multi-year contracts. 
They give the example of catastrophe bonds which tend to have a maturity of around 3 years. However, it seems likely that 
reinsurers would face the same disadvantages and impediments to providing multi-year (re)insurance and so transferring the 
risks up the insurance chain would be unlikely to increase the feasibility of the concept. 
12
 Aerts and Botzen (2011) highlight the difficulties in developing such a risk index for natural hazards, given gaps in data 
availability (e.g. up-to-date risk maps, reflecting changes in protective infrastructure) and the challenges in disentangling 
trends in risk from statistical noise (e.g. due to chaotic weather) and short-term risk variations (e.g. climate cycles, such as the 
removes some of the benefit of a multi-year contract, in particular, the financial stability created for 
the policyholder and the benefit of reduced administrative costs for the insurer. The option to vary the 
premium would likely need to be accompanied by a right to cancel, removing the security of the long-
term relationship between the insurer and policyholder. 
 
V. Practical challenges for adaptation 
 
V.1. Challenges of risk-based Pricing and premium discounts 
Without risk-based premiums, and associated premium discounts for risk reduction, multi-year 
contracts will not provide an appropriate incentive to reduce risk. However, risk-based premiums are 
rare in the general retail insurance market and this reflects a number of operational challenges. Firstly, 
in some markets, such as in a number of the US Gulf States, premiums are artificially suppressed by 
price regulation or subsidy programmes (Grace and Klein, 2009; Klein, 2008). Hence, the success of 
insurance pricing as an economic tool for adaptation relies on removing any regulation of the price of 
insurance (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009). However, although in aggregate insurers must cover 
their risks, even in markets with competitive pricing (e.g. most of Europe), premiums rarely reflect 
individual risk in all cases. There is a history of cross-subsidisation of premiums across regions and 
lines of business, as a result of a culture of solidarity, the nature of traditional bundling of different 
hazards in a contract, or as a commercial strategy to extend the market by increasing affordability. 
Where natural catastrophe risk is underpriced, insurers are understandably reluctant to offer discounts 
to those undertaking cost-effective risk reduction measures.  
 
There are also technical barriers to risk-based pricing and premium discounts for risk 
reduction. The level of risk faced by a property is site- and building-specific, particularly for hazards 
such as flooding. In insurance pricing today, typically generalisations are made to local areas and 
types of buildings to approximate the level of risk. This is sufficient given that the risks (and therefore, 
uncertainties) are well diversified. However, to provide appropriate economic incentives, premiums 
would need to more accurately reflect risk and in particular, the reduction in risk associated with 
investments in property-level resistance and resilience. For this, the underwriting process would 
require a higher degree of information and the administrative costs of the policy would rise 
accordingly. A particular concern is the need for on-site verification of the level of protection. Regular 
validation would be required, perhaps by a third party, to confirm that protection measures were 
                                                                                                                                                        
El Nino Southern Oscillation). Indices would also need to reflect changes in broader conditions, such as the cost of capital 
and insured asset values. 
present and adequately maintained. In a competitive market, such products could look unattractive 
compared to cheaper annual contracts13. From an insurer perspective, offering such policies would 
increase uncertainty in a portfolio, particularly in the early years until experience is gained.  
 
V.2. Mismatch between payback periods and contract duration 
To incentivise risk reduction, a longer contract (and tied to a long-term loan) is more 
beneficial as the payback period for property-level risk reduction through an insurance premium 
discount would be often in excess of five to 10 years. To give a simple example, a recent study found 
that replacing the wall plaster of a property with a water resistant material to improve flood resilience 
would cost around £2,900 (if installed during repair) and would have a payback of £3,400 in the event 
of an extreme flood (ABI, 2009). If we assume the probably of an extreme flood were around 1-in-10 
(that is, a highly hazard-prone region) then this would amount to a reduction in the technical risk 
premium of around £340 per year; hence a payback period of 8.5 years. In a lower (but still high) risk 
region, where the probability of an extreme flood was 1 in 30 years, the payback period would be 25.5 
years. To provide a strong incentive, the insurance contract would need to be at least as long as the 
payback period. But, empirical evidence suggests a limit on the term of a multi-year contract of around 
5 years (Goss and O’Neill, 2010); historically multi-year insurance contracts have been enforceable 
under EU legal systems for up to five years, but not beyond (EC, 2007) and in its 2009 survey, the 
ABI found that of those consumers that expressed an interest in multi-year contracts, around 40% saw 
3 years as the maximum desirable policy term and a further 40% gave 5 years.  This suggests a 
mismatch between the payback period and the desirable duration of a multi-year contract; a shorter 
contract of around 3 – 5 years may have little advantage over an annual contract in terms of incentive. 
 
VI. Discussion 
The previous sections have demonstrated that multi-year contracts have a number of 
advantages for policyholders and insurers, but also several disadvantages, in particular, for the private 
insurer. In a competitive market, these disadvantages are likely to provide an impediment to insurers 
offering of multi-year contracts. The absence of multi-year contracts in the general retail insurance 
market today suggests that these disadvantages are seen as greater than the benefits of a longer-term 
relationship between the insurer and the insured. 
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 In the Florida Wind Mitigation Credit scheme, these problems were overcome by making premium discounts 
mandatory, providing an inspection scheme and regulating the level of price discounts. However, there are 
suggestions that this scheme has lead to distortions in the insurance market (RMS, 2010).  
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) suggest that the wide availability of long-term 
mortgage contracts provides evidence for the viability of multi-year financial contracts for property-
owners. We argue that mortgages provide a poor comparison in this respect. Firstly, typically the 
repayment rate is floating, allowing the lender to associate rates to changing conditions. Where fixed 
rate deals are available this is usually with duration of not more than 5 years. In addition, mortgage 
risks generally decrease over time as the mortgage is repaid; the loan is secured on a property 
(providing a cushion where the house price exceeds the outstanding loan) with a value expected to 
increase on average each year; and for fixed rate deals, the lender can hedge their risk. For property 
insurance, the balance of evidence points toward an increase in risk over time, possibly including 
sudden jumps, and there is no cushion. Finally, as was demonstrated by the subprime mortgage crisis 
in 2008, the mortgage business can also yield unanticipated risks and lock-in significant liabilities for 
the provider. Looking more broadly, the wider financial markets rarely offer products with long-term 
guarantees and where they do so it is typically only where a counterparty can be found whose own 
concerns are negatively correlated. One example is put options in the investment market, which give 
the holder the right to sell an asset for a minimum value and so provide guarantee against market 
fluctuations. These contracts are often perceived to be expensive and are typically of short term. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that there may be greater opportunities for multi-year contracts in 
the commercial insurance business and for high net worth individuals. European Commission (2007) 
reports that while on average the duration of contracts in the commercial property insurance market 
was 12 months for EU member states, countries such as Slovenia, Austria, Italy and the Netherlands 
do have much longer average durations of between six and eight years. Goss and O’Neill (2010) report 
contracts for high net worth individuals of around 3 years.  
 
Purely public insurance schemes, like the US National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), may 
also have greater prospects for multi-year insurance (Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther 2011). Public 
insurance schemes may have lower capital requirements and so the price differential compared with an 
annual contract could be lower. In addition, insolvency is less problematic as public schemes may be 
able to raise additional capital at low cost from taxation and therefore, the risk of future liabilities (e.g. 
resulting from long-term guarantees under uncertainty) are a smaller concern. In addition, a purely 
public insurance scheme is not subject to competitive forces on price and multi-year contracts could be 
offered as standard. 
 
We suggest that a situation where the benefits of multi-year contracts for the private insurer 
could outweigh the disadvantages might be where there are predictable cycles in the level of risk, such 
as in regions where hazard levels are determined by the El Nino Southern Oscillation (Jerry Skees, 
pers. comm.). Where there is predictability, insurers could be at risk of adverse selection as the 
policyholder would buy insurance only when hazard levels are predicted to be high. A multi-year 
contract could remove this risk in such markets. 
 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2009) propose multi-year contracts as one of a package of 
policy and economic tools to incentivise risk reduction. We conclude that in general the proposals 
made by Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan could have significant benefits for climate change adaptation; 
but that these benefits come not from the multi-year insurance contracts themselves, but from the 
associated tools associated with them, including: transparent and risk-based insurance pricing; 
inexpensive loans for risk reduction tied to the property; the reflection of risk reduction investments in 
property prices; the removal of the disincentive provided by the expectation of public aid; and 
improving the awareness of risk and the availability of information. We argue that these tools are more 
practical and can have much higher value for adaptation.  
 
This set of tools goes well beyond what the insurance industry alone can provide. From this 
analysis, we conclude that the immediate challenge for the insurance industry then, with the greatest 
value for adaptation, is to provide transparent, risk-based premiums. The lack of risk-based premiums 
today is a disincentive for risk reduction. This is no easy task. In particular, there are considerable 
administrative and technical challenges for insurers in providing risk-appropriate premium discounts 
for property owners that invest in risk reduction. These challenges would be lessened in the 
commercial insurance business and insurance for high-net worth individuals; where administrative 
costs are typically a much smaller fraction of the total premium and so more significant investments 
can be made in accurate risk estimation. We suggest that to promote autonomous adaptation, a priority 
for the insurance industry is to explore methods and tools that would facilitate more accurate property-
level estimation of risk at lower cost per policy. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper we have reviewed the arguments for and against multi-year contracts as a tool for 
adaptation and have provided new analyses on their price implications. Simple simulations 
demonstrate that, even under conditions of stationary and known risk, multi-year insurance policies 
are more expensive than annual policies. In our model, capital requirements are around 50% higher for 
a 10-year contract than an annual contract and the annual premium around 5.5% higher. In the real 
world, additional factors, in particular the ambiguity involved in anticipating long-term risk, would 
push premiums even higher. In addition to higher prices, we conclude that multi-year contracts have a 
number of disadvantages that are likely to limit their availability in the general retail insurance market 
and by private insurers. In extreme cases, the long-term guarantees implied by multi-year contracts 
suggest a significant risk to the ongoing solvency of insurers. We do not find strong evidence that 
multi-year contracts alone could provide adequate incentives for risk reduction amongst property 
owners; further research and pilot projects would be required to demonstrate this advantage. Our 
preliminary assessment suggests that other tools, such as risk-based pricing and loans tied to the 
property, have much greater prospects for incentivising risk reduction. We conclude that the 
immediate challenge for the insurance industry then, with the greatest value for adaptation, is to 
provide transparent, risk-based premiums.  
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Appendix A:  Capital Requirements and Premium Model 
 
This appendix describes the model for calculating the premium of a multi-year contract based on 
Kreps (1990).  
 
The model framework 
The model represents a stochastic claims process C, as well as an expenses process X and investment 
process S, where: Cj is the value of claims occurring in year j; Xj is the value of expenses occurring in 
year j; Sj is the annual return in investment, that is, the value of one currency unit, invested at the start 
of year j, at the end of year j (n.b. is not a cumulative return).  
 
The pricing formula is given by Eqn. A.1, where K is the capital requirement for the policy and α 
represents the return on capital demanded by shareholders.  
 
KXECEPd ⋅++= α)()(      (A.1) 
 
Eqn. 1 shows that the premium must be equal to the sum of the expected claims and expenses, plus a 
‘capital loading’ to produce the required average return on capital for shareholders. To simplify the 
model, we assume that premiums are paid at the start of year j and the claims and expenses occur 
immediately afterward. 
 
The stochastic model is used to estimate the capital requirement K based on a solvency condition that 
K + Pd is sufficient to cover the total value claims and expenses over the duration of the policy with a 
99.5% probability (i.e. for 199 out of 200 random draws from the distributions of claims C, expenses 
X and investment S). The solvency condition must be met in all years of the contract14 (in practice it is 
measured at the end of each year in the model). 
 
Under the formulation of the multi-year contract we are considering the company cannot change the 
premium rate during the contract term.  This provides the policyholder a long-term guarantee of 
insurability, for a certain price, over the policy term.  The shareholder must supply enough capital to 
                                                 
14
 We note that the condition that 1-in-200 year solvency is maintained at all times is slightly different from 
Solvency II (which requires solvency from balance sheet to balance sheet), but we would not expect this 
alternative formulation to alter the conclusions. 
ensure the level of protection falls no lower than 1 in 200 over the period of cover.  This is to ensure a 
similar level of protection as a policyholder buying an annual premium.  In the annual premium case 
there is a 1 in 200 risk of losing some money from insurer default each year.  At the end of a year the 
policyholder purchases their next year of cover, in so doing they re-set the default risk to 1 in 200.  Of 
course the premium might be purchased from a different insurer and they run the risk that the premium 
is higher if insurer’s perception of risk levels have changed or the cost of capital has increased over the 
prior year.   The fact that in the multi-year case the policyholder doesn’t bear the premium rate risk but 
enjoys the same level of prudential protection is precisely why the premium is higher.   The fact that 
shareholders must put up capital that (at least initially) is thought to be appropriate for the whole 
policy term, with no opportunity to increase premiums in the future, is precisely why the capital must 
be higher at the start.     
 
We argue above that the policyholder should enjoy the same level of protection throughout the policy 
term as they would in a series of annual policies.  This is one point of view and others are possible – in 
some settings an increasing probability of default as the term increases is thought acceptable.  An 
alternative formulation would be to look at the new EU Solvency II approach where the insurer has to 
ensure they have enough capital to survive a series of deviations between balance sheets.  Yet another 
approach could look at expected policyholder deficits.  Whilst these may lead to differences in the 
absolute relationship between capital and premium and different premium levels, we do not believe it 
will change the overall conclusions, that premiums will be higher for multiyear policies.    We may 
consider these alternative approaches in a future paper.  However, we take some comfort that the 
approach in this paper is broadly equal to the approach of the UK regulator as regards liability policies 
where losses emerge over a multiyear period and firms are required to capitalise to ultimate levels of 
loss – not interim ones. 
 
The model is set up as described below: 
 
The “asset share” Qn is equal to the accumulation, at the earned investment rate Sj, of premium (given 
by Eqn. A.1) minus claims and expenses at the end of the contract, where n is the policy term: 
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Here i is the time at which the cash flows occur and j is time in which investment return occurs after 
point i. 
 
Equation A.2 implies that claims in a given year occur just after the premium is paid.  In reality claims 
can occur at any time during the year.  This approach is taken to simplify the formulae but will not 
materially change the conclusions.  If, for example, claims were assumed to occur mid year on average 
then the premium formula would be amended by discounting the claim by half a year of investment 
return.  As such the calculated premium would be slightly lower.  The additional investment return this 
produces would flow through into the asset share – and this would also slightly reduce the capital 
required.  The relationship between premium and capital would be very similar, hence we feel justified 
in keeping the equations simple.  
 
Formula A.2 assumes that the cost of capital margin (αK) is reinvested until the policy matures.  In 
practice (in periods of good claims experience) a portion of this may be considered “earned” an paid to 
shareholders in dividends.  This would be more complex to model and would increase capital 
requirements still further as any removal of profits reduces the capital buffer.  The point we wish to 
make is that capital requirements for multi-year policies would be significantly higher, we believe we 
have achieved this goal without the need to increase complexity. 
 
We define Qo to be to discounted value of Qn at the start of the policy term (Eqn. A.3), so that Qo is 
negative in cases where the claims and expenses exceed the premiums on average.  
∏
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Qn and Q0 are stochastic quantities. To meet the solvency condition the following must be true: K + Qo 
> 0 in 199 out of 200 cases (i.e. random draws). From eqns. A.2 and A.3 this can be expressed as: 
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simulation-specific annuity factor. This equation can be rearranged to give: 
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Given this formula, the value is K is estimated by simulation. To find the 1-in-200 year solvency level, 
we could run 10,000 simulations and select the value of K that is the 50th highest. However, this does 
not ensure continuous solvency, only that the condition is met at the end of the contract period. A 
closer approximation to continuous solvency is achieved by the following: 
 
We denote the RHS of Eqn. A.4 as ),,,( nSXCf and then define: 
 
),,,(max:),,,(
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Then in each simulation, we calculate ),,,( nSXCg and select the value of K so that it exceeds g in 
all but the worst 1 out of 200 cases.  
 
 
Parameters of the stochastic simulation 
We assume a stationary risk scenario (i.e. no climate change or other trends such as claims inflation), 
with the three stochastic processes represented by distributions outlined in Table A.1. Under this 
scenario, a sequence of annual policies would have the same premium each year.  
 
Table A.1. Definition of stochastic variables in the example 
Process Mathematical Definition 
Claims (C) Lognormal distribution with mean 9 and variance 5 
Expenses (X) Gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance 0.25 
Investments (S) Exponential Brownian motion process with drift 0.04 and volatility 0.03 
 
Sensitivity tests are also carried out by adjusting the variance (between 3 and 7) and form (lognormal, 
gamma and pareto) of the claims distribution. We find that adjusting the claims distribution changes 
the premium but does not change the relationship between the premium and the policy term (Figure 
A.1). 
 Figure A.1. The simulated relationship between premium and length of policy term under different 
representations of the claims distribution 
